

HANDLED VIA TALENT-

KEYHOLE CONTROLS  
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP79M00097A000100030003-6  
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27 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIPE

SUBJECT : The Blue Ribbon Panel's Report and DASD/I's  
Organizational Proposals

1. The thread which runs through the analysis of defense intelligence by the Blue Ribbon Panel is that defense intelligence is made up of a number of elements which, despite their obvious relationships, act in an uncoordinated and less than responsive fashion. The Panel proposes a cure that would reorganize defense intelligence, provide it with centralized leadership, and give new emphasis to the basic functions of intelligence. In our view the key proposal is the one which would give new emphasis to the basic functions. Although the proposed organizational changes probably would facilitate the goals of better performance and greater efficiency (with respect to the basic functions), and have a certain appeal in their simplicity when compared to today's relatively unwieldy structure, we believe that the actual form of the organization is less important than concentrating on the job and providing the necessary impetus.

2. The major difficulty we have with the five alternative proposals prepared in DASD/I is that they are not related to all of the basic functions of intelligence, particularly those which we consider to be of key importance. (They are, however, related to the Panel's recommendations for reorganization and centralization.) The Panel indicated six such functions which we have redefined as five: 1) production requirements -- to determine the needs of consumers; 2) production (and dissemination) -- to fulfill production requirements; 3) collection requirements -- to task the collection and processing resources for the information required to support production; 4) collection and processing resources -- to fulfill collection requirements; and 5) evaluation -- to determine whether or not each of the preceding functions is being done in optimum fashion and that the balance among them is optimum.

3. Production requirements tend to be deficient because there is no cohesive effort to elicit and organize consumer needs and their relative importance or value. Production tends to be deficient because production

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requirements are deficient and because too many units produce what is ostensibly the same product which, when a common product is necessary, leads to watered-down compromises. Collection requirements tend to be deficient because they are incomplete and lack any framework which shows their relationship to production requirements, their part in the total picture, their relationship to each other, and their relative importance or value. The development, procurement, and exploitation of collection and processing resources tend to be deficient because collection requirements are deficient and the several programs are operated almost as if other programs were in no way complementary or duplicatory. Evaluation tends to be deficient largely because without adequate production and collection requirements there are no adequate yardsticks by which to measure performance.

4. Clearly, each of these deficiencies relates intimately to the others. Two of them, however -- inadequate production requirements and inadequate collection requirements -- are key because they impede fulfillment of all the basic functions. These two deficiencies have a common bond in that both require some form of centralized direction if they are to be overcome. Without centralized direction (responsibility) it is difficult to see how single, useful (validated), lists of the respective requirements and their relative values will ever be obtained, much less (for evaluation) the relationships between the two lists.

5. With centralized direction to deal with these two critical deficiencies, the other deficiencies (relating to production, resources, and evaluation) might well take care of themselves -- even under the present organization. But if centralization is undertaken for the critical deficiencies, it should make the additional centralization recommended by the Panel easier to accomplish.

6. The problems of defense intelligence lead quite naturally into consideration of defense intelligence as a part of the overall intelligence community and the need for community-wide solutions for some of the same problems -- most particularly, the two critical deficiencies. With or without strong, centralized, direction of defense intelligence (although centralized direction should make it somewhat easier to proceed), USIB and NIRB are logical organizations to have responsibility for direction of the basic functions on a community-wide basis. USIB could give the necessary emphasis to production requirements and collection requirements (the information to be collected, not the systems needed or to be used) and,

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of course, continue its responsibilities for the status of production of national intelligence. Thus, USIB would have responsibility for the functions which involve the two critical deficiencies. NIRB could have comparable responsibility for resources and evaluation which should entail, among other things, a national CIRIS and a national index of resource capabilities.

7. Although the question of EXCOM first arose in our minds as a result of the fourth organizational alternative proposed by DASD/I (it would integrate NRO into a DIOA), we believe that its role warrants reexamination irrespective of organizational alternatives or whether the defense intelligence community or the overall community is being considered. We suggest that under any of these circumstances it would be desirable that EXCOM be elevated to do for all programs what it now does for NRO and that the DCI, in his role of principal intelligence advisor to the President, be its chairman. The rest of the membership, in concept, probably should include only the Office of Management and Budget and the President's Scientific Advisor, but as a practical matter also should include Defense, State, and CIA. An ASD/I, as well as his State and CIA counterparts, should have the same relationship to this new EXCOM as the Director NRO now has to the present EXCOM.

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DCI/NIPE/SAG

CONCUR:



ASA/D/DCI/NIPE

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 Mr. Morrison  *pm*  
 YNCS Reynolds

<u>LEFT</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>INFO</u>
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Mr. Curts		(C)
Mr. Pryde		(P)
Col Schaf		(S)
Mr. Seidel		(T)
Mr. Vance		(V)
Maj Mayer		(M)

<u>RIGHT</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>INFO</u>
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Mr. Fricl		(F)
Dr. Gigrich		(G)
Capt Jennings		(J)
Cdr Martin	X W	(W)
L/C Shufelt	X QM	(Q)

<u>ADMIN</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>INFO</u>
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TSGT Walters		(W)

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REFERRED	<i>Mr. Morrison</i>	<i>VADM Bowen</i>	<i>Info to Staff</i>	<i>Lt Col Shul</i>	<i>Mr. Martin</i>	
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*Memorandum for D/DCI/WIPE, sub: The Blue Ribbon Panel's Report and DADP (r) in preparation*

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